As M23 continues its harmful march, the EAC-SADC summit should think about classes from failed peace efforts.
On 27 January, Rwanda-backed Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) forces took management of Goma, capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) North Kivu province. Town’s seize and M23’s advances in direction of Bukavu in South Kivu mark a drastic escalation of the insurrection since peace talks collapsed below the Luanda and Nairobi processes – with devastating humanitarian and civilian penalties.
The East African Group (EAC) and Southern African Growth Group (SADC) are prioritising the battle. Leaders from the 2 areas will meet on 8 February in Dar es Salaam to debate choices for stabilising the area. Given the 2 blocs’ totally different approaches to japanese DRC, classes from each processes should inform discussions.
Goma and Bukavu, East DRC
Below the African Union (AU)-backed Luanda Course of, began in 2022, Rwandan President Paul Kagame was scheduled to satisfy DRC President Felix Tshisekedi in mid-December 2024 to signal a provisional peace settlement. However Kagame cancelled as a result of the DRC refused to incorporate a dedication to dialogue with M23, because it (the DRC) sees the Luanda Course of as strictly between states.
This growth blocked earlier progress, when members agreed that the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (FDLR) – a Hutu armed group working in japanese DRC – can be neutralised in trade for Rwanda lifting its ‘defensive measures’ (a mutually understood reference to Rwanda withdrawing from the world.)
Led by the EAC, the Nairobi Course of focuses on inter-Congolese hostilities. Its work has additionally been troublesome, partly as a result of the DRC considers a number of EAC nations, notably Kenya, biased in direction of Rwanda.
These regional tensions, together with strain on Tshisekedi from the DRC citizens to indicate navy outcomes, led the Congolese authorities to push for the EAC regional power’s early withdrawal from japanese DRC. The power was deployed in November 2022 to assist restore stability. It was changed with the SADC Mission within the DRC (SAMIDRC).
Regardless of their failures, all worldwide and regional emergency summits on the disaster have referred to as for renewed help for each processes. The EAC, SADC and AU additionally sought to harmonise regional approaches via a second AU Quadripartite Summit and a joint EAC-SADC summit.
Though there may be broad help for regional efforts, important variations in strategy can’t be ignored. A number of EAC nations think about a dialogue between Kinshasa and M23 as the one viable path ahead, they usually chorus from publicly referring to Rwanda’s involvement.
In distinction, SADC condemned M23’s latest assaults on SAMIDRC, referred to as for Rwandan withdrawal, and reaffirmed help for the DRC. (It is value noting that the DRC is a member of each the EAC and SADC, whereas Rwanda is a member of the EAC.)
SAMIDRC’s future is nevertheless now unsure, with Malawi planning to withdraw its troops. Rwanda has criticised the mission for being an offensive power and for bringing ‘battle to Rwanda.’ Tellingly, Tshisekedi skipped the EAC extraordinary summit on 29 January, going as a substitute to Angola (a SADC nation) to deliberate with President João Lourenço.
Each regional efforts should adapt to the brand new realities of the M23 insurrection on the bottom. These embrace its territorial growth and connections to different armed teams, facilitated by the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). The alliance is led by former DRC electoral fee head Corneille Nangaa Yobeluo, whose nationwide political agenda has incentivised different regional actors to interact with the AFC.
M23 is up towards not solely the Congolese military and overseas troops, but additionally a coalition of armed teams below the banner of ‘Wazalendo’ (patriots). Congolese authorities guarantees that they are going to be built-in into a military reserve power undermine the Nairobi Course of’ demobilisation efforts and should gas additional armed mobilisation.
Peace talks should think about not solely the FDLR, but additionally the broader navy escalation within the east. This contains addressing the presence of hundreds of Burundian troopers deployed to combat M23 alongside the Congolese military and allied militias since 2023. Their deployment fuelled regional tensions with Rwanda, and several other Burundian troopers are believed to stay captured by M23.
Rwandan help to M23 has been decisive for the armed group’s growth; it is uncertain M23 might have conquered Goma with out it. Regional actors – together with within the EAC – ought to overtly acknowledge this.
They need to clearly sign to Rwanda that no humanitarian justifications or safety issues warrant this violence on the Congolese inhabitants or the blatant disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one other state. These are after all of the foundational rules for regional and worldwide frameworks.
Rwanda’s open reference to the arbitrariness of colonial borders as root causes for the battle ought to be a matter of worldwide concern. Whereas it is very important tackle Rwanda’s humanitarian and safety issues, it should be recognised that the vulnerability of Congolese Tutsis, anti-Rwandan extremism and hyperlinks between the DRC military and FDLR have been aggravated by each the M23 insurrection and nationalist Congolese demagoguery.
Kinshasa describes M23 as a ‘Rwandan puppet’, and Kigali calls the armed group a ‘home Congolese drawback’ – however neither is totally true. M23 is each a Congolese motion and aligned with Rwandan pursuits. The group additionally faces inside variations and beforehand break up into regional factions with competing loyalties.
M23’s authentic agenda is strongly related to calls for for the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees from primarily Rwanda to japanese DRC, and the combination of the motion’s members into the DRC state and military. However its agenda has developed all through its resurgence because the finish of 2021, with M23 signalling its intent to offer a substitute for the Congolese state within the areas it controls.
Regardless of AFC leaders’ acknowledged intentions to march to Kinshasa, most M23 commanders possible prioritise native agendas in North Kivu over nationwide regime change.
Regional diplomacy should have in mind these dynamics. Equally related is japanese DRC’s complicated geopolitics between neighbouring nations, based mostly on cross-border ethnic ties, financial and safety motivations, and home political points.
Whereas regional diplomacy ought to help dialogue, it should even be pragmatic. Merely calling for the DRC to barter with M23 will possible fall on deaf ears and additional frustrate Kinshasa. Discrete diplomacy with M23 by way of back-channel talks is essentially the most sensible path, together with efforts to deliver Rwanda and the DRC again to the desk.
There are constructive indicators that diplomatic engagement could be renewed. First, on 3 February, M23 unilaterally introduced a humanitarian ceasefire, probably in anticipation of the EAC-SADC summit that Rwanda and DRC will attend. Nonetheless, the group has since continued to maneuver via South Kivu.
Second, Nationwide Meeting Speaker Very important Kamerhe has referred to as for diplomatic restraint and requested to discover diplomatic resolutions to the disaster. And third, the EAC-SADC summit opens avenues for dialogue and revitalising the Nairobi Course of to enrich the Luanda Course of.
Nonetheless, with M23 progressing in direction of Bukavu and Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye overtly warning of a full-scale regional battle, the 2 regional blocs ought to be sensible about anticipated outcomes of the joint summit.
Given the heightened tensions, quick priorities are a ceasefire and opening provide routes to facilitate humanitarian entry which may very well be monitored via the joint EAC-SADC initiative. Such selections ought to be endorsed by the AU’s 15-16 February Peace and Safety Council Heads of State assembly.
A single unified peace initiative might forestall Rwanda and the DRC from participating in discussion board procuring as they’ve performed with the Nairobi and Luanda processes – favouring mediators perceived to help their facet.
Bram Verelst, Senior Researcher, Battle Prevention, Administration and Peacebuilding within the Nice Lakes Area, ISS Nairobi
Nicodemus Minde, Researcher, East Africa Peace and Safety Governance, ISS Nairobi
